The constitutional dilemma of European integration
AbstractThe paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 35437.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Prisoners Dilemma; constitutions; constitutional economics; public choice; European Union;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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"Frihed mellem fornuft og skepsis
[Liberty - between reason and skepticism]," MPRA Paper 43542, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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