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The constitutional dilemma of European integration

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  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter

Abstract

The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 1998. "The constitutional dilemma of European integration," MPRA Paper 35437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35437
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35437/1/MPRA_paper_35437.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roland Vaubel, 1996. "Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 79-102, June.
    2. Vaubel, Roland, 1994. "The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-190, October.
    3. Peirce, William S, 1991. "After 1992: The European Community and the Redistribution of Rents," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 521-536.
    4. repec:mea:ivswpa:532 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Robert H. Bates, 1988. "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," Politics & Society, , vol. 16(2-3), pages 387-401, June.
    6. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The constitutional reform of the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 443-450, April.
    7. Voigt, Stefan, 1997. "Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March.
    8. Mueller, Dennis C, 1997. "Federalism and the European Union: A Constitutional Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 255-280, March.
    9. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    10. Robert H. Bates & Steven A. Block & Ghada Fayad & Anke Hoeffler, 2013. "The New Institutionalism and Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 22(4), pages 499-522, August.
    11. Hampton, Jean, 1987. "Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 245-273, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 245-278, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2012. "Frihed mellem fornuft og skepsis [Liberty - between reason and skepticism]," MPRA Paper 43542, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoners Dilemma; constitutions; constitutional economics; public choice; European Union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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