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Large Shareholding and Firm Value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

Author

Listed:
  • Mona Mortazian

    (Brunel University London)

  • Seyedeh Asieh H. Tabaghdehi

    (Regents University London)

  • Bryan Mase

    (Brunel University London)

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32%. However, when their block sizes exceed 32%, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Mona Mortazian & Seyedeh Asieh H. Tabaghdehi & Bryan Mase, 2019. "Large Shareholding and Firm Value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 26(2), pages 229-252, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:apfinm:v:26:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10690-018-9256-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3
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    1. Mona Mortazian, 2022. "Liquidity and Volatility of Stocks Moved from the Main Market to the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 29(2), pages 195-220, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Alternative Investment Market (AIM); Managerial blockholders; Firm value; Tobin’s Q; Generalized Method of Moments (GMM);
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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