Valuing Easements: Some Experimental Evidence
AbstractTrefzger and Munneke (1998) present a theoretical model, where the surplus that an easement gives rise to will be split equally between the parties. We provide experimental evidence from Sweden indicating that the split of the surplus depends on the context and what is judged to be reasonable principles of a fair distribution. The dominant estates got a significantly higher share of the surplus because they could start the bargaining with a bid that only included compensation for cost, whereas the servient estate could not find any principle that would give them the whole surplus. After these initial asymmetric bids, the parties usually met halfway.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Real Estate Society in its journal Journal of Real Estate Research.
Volume (Year): 18 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323
Web page: http://www.aresnet.org/
Postal: Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph W. Trefzger & Henry J. Munneke, 1998. "Valuing Easements: A Simple Bargaining Framework," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 16(2), pages 127-138.
- Sefton, Martin & Yavas, Abdullah, 1996. "Threat to Regulate and Coordination Failures: Experimental Evidence," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 97-115, January.
- Abdullah Yavas & Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, 2001. "An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 29(2), pages 251-276.
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