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Vekâlet Kuramına Göre Türkiye’deki Otellerin Pazara Giriş Stratejilerinin Değerlendirilmesi

Author

Listed:
  • Ece ZEYBEK YILMAZ

    (Marmara Üniversitesi, İstanbul, Türkiye)

  • Göksel ATAMAN BERK

    (Marmara Üniversitesi, İşletme Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Abstract

Bu araştırmada işletmelerin pazara giriş stratejilerine göre yaşanan vekâlet sorunlarından ahlaki tehlike ve ters seçim riski ile karşılaşma olasılıkları arasındaki farklılık durumları incelenmiştir. Bu kapsamda Türkiye’de faaliyet gösteren 5 yıldızlı otel işletmelerinde yönetici pozisyonunda çalışan (asil ve vekil) 46 kişi ile derinlemesine mülakat gerçekleştirilmiştir. Elde edilen veriler NVivo 12 Pro paket programında analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonuçlarına göre ahlaki tehlike boyutu altında haksız kazanç, mevzuata uygunluk ve sözleşmenin feshine ilişkin üç temel kod belirlenirken, ters seçim riski boyutu ise bedavacılık ve güven kodları altında ele alınmıştır. Katılımcı ifadelerine göre seçilen pazara giriş stratejilerine göre yaşanan ahlaki tehlike ve ters seçim riskinin oranı arasında anlamlı bir fark olmadığı ortaya konulmuştur. Buna karşın otel işletmelerinin yapısı gereği gerçekleştirilen denetlemelerin özellikle zincir işletmelerde hem marka tarafından, hem de yasal olarak yapılmasının ahlaki tehlike ve ters seçim riskini azalttığı söylenebilir. Katılımcıların ifadelerine göre bazı otel işletmelerinde birden fazla pazara giriş şeklinin aynı anda tercih edildiği görülmektedir, bunun ekonomik nedenleri olduğu gibi vekâlet problemlerinin önlenmesinde yönelik de olduğu söylenebilir. Stratejilerinin Değerlendirilmesi

Suggested Citation

  • Ece ZEYBEK YILMAZ & Göksel ATAMAN BERK, 2020. "Vekâlet Kuramına Göre Türkiye’deki Otellerin Pazara Giriş Stratejilerinin Değerlendirilmesi," Istanbul Management Journal, Istanbul University Business School, vol. 0(88), pages 145-168, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ist:ibsimj:v:0:y:2020:i:87:p:145-168
    DOI: 10.26650/imj.2020.88.0006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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