Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
AbstractIn combinatorial auctions, multiple distinct items are sold simultaneously and a bidder may place a single bid on a set (package) of distinct items. The determination of packages for bidding is a nontrivial task, and existing efficient formats require that bidders know the set of packages and/or their valuations. In this paper, we extend an efficient ascending combinatorial auction mechanism to use approximate single-item pricing. The single-item prices in each round are derived from a linear program that is constructed to reflect the current allocation of packages. Introduction of approximate single-item prices allows for endogenous bid determination where bidders can discover packages that were not included in the original bid set. Due to nonconvexities, single-item prices may not exist that are exact marginal values. We show that the use of approximate single-item prices with endogenous bidding always produces allocations that are at least as efficient as those from bidding with a fixed set of packages based on package pricing. A network resource allocation example is given that illustrates the benefits of our endogenous bidding mechanism.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.
Volume (Year): 51 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
combinatorial auctions; mathematical programming;
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- Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Drexl, Andreas & Jörnsten, Kurt, 2005. "Reflections about pseudo-dual prices in combinatorial auctions," Discussion Papers 2005/1, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
- Drexl, Andreas & Jörnsten, Kurt & Knof, Diether, 2005. "Non-linear anonymous pricing in combinatorial auctions," Discussion Papers 2005/6, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
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