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Social Capital and Contract Duration in Buyer-Supplier Networks for Information Technology Outsourcing

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  • Kiron Ravindran

    (IE Business School, University of Madrid, 28006 Madrid, Spain)

  • Anjana Susarla

    (Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824)

  • Deepa Mani

    (Indian School of Business, Gachibowli, Hyderabad 500032, India)

  • Vijay Gurbaxani

    (University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92697)

Abstract

This paper presents new evidence on the role of embeddedness in predicting contract duration in the context of information technology outsourcing. Contract duration is a strategic decision that aligns interests of clients and vendors, providing the benefits of business continuity to clients and incentives to undertake relationship specific investments for vendors. Considering the salience of this phenomenon, there has been limited empirical scrutiny of how contract duration is awarded. We posit that clients and vendors obtain two benefits from being embedded in an interorganizational network. First, the learning and experience accumulated from being embedded in a client-vendor network could mitigate the challenges in managing longer term contracts. Second, the network serves as a reputation system that can stratify vendors according to their trustworthiness and reliability, which is important in longer term arrangements. In particular, we attempt to make a substantive contribution to the literature by theorizing about embeddedness at four distinct levels: structural embeddedness at the node level, relational embeddedness at the dyad level, contractual embeddedness at the level of a neighborhood of contracts, and finally, positional embeddedness at the level of the entire network. We analyze a data set of 22,039 outsourcing contracts implemented between 1989 and 2008. We find that contract duration is indeed associated with structural and positional embeddedness of participant firms, with the relational embeddedness of the buyer-seller dyad, and with the duration of other contracts to which it is connected through common firms. Given the nature of our data, identification using traditional ordinary least squares based approaches is difficult given the unobserved errors clustered along two nonnested dimensions and the autocorrelation in a firm’s decision (here the contract) with those of contracts in its reference group. We use a multiway cluster robust estimation and a network auto-regressive estimation to address these issues. Implications for literature and practice are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Kiron Ravindran & Anjana Susarla & Deepa Mani & Vijay Gurbaxani, 2015. "Social Capital and Contract Duration in Buyer-Supplier Networks for Information Technology Outsourcing," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 379-397, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:orisre:v:26:y:2015:i:2:p:379-397
    DOI: 10.1287/isre.2015.0572
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    3. Anandasivam Gopal & Sabari Rajan Karmegam & Balaji R. Koka & William M. Rand, 2020. "Is the Grass Greener? On the Strategic Implications of Moving Along the Value Chain for IT Service Providers," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(1), pages 148-175, March.
    4. Krishnan S. Anand & Manu Goyal, 2019. "Ethics, Bounded Rationality, and IP Sharing in IT Outsourcing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5252-5267, November.
    5. (Daniel) Kao, Ta-Wei & Su, Hung-Chung & Chen, Yi-Su, 2019. "The curvilinear relationships between structural embeddedness and productive efficiency: An exploratory study," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 176-185.
    6. Yili Hong & Paul A. Pavlou, 2017. "On Buyer Selection of Service Providers in Online Outsourcing Platforms for IT Services," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 547-562, September.
    7. Irfan Kanat & Yili Hong & T. S. Raghu, 2018. "Surviving in Global Online Labor Markets for IT Services: A Geo-Economic Analysis," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 893-909, December.
    8. Zhou, Meihua & Angelopoulos, Spyros & Ou, Carol & Liu, Hongwei & Liang, Zhouyang, 2023. "Optimization of dynamic product offerings on online marketplaces: A network theory perspective," Other publications TiSEM 75d71155-88bf-4ff7-aba1-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Michael Weiler & Oliver Hinz, 2019. "Without each other, we have nothing: a state-of-the-art analysis on how to operationalize social capital," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 13(5), pages 1003-1035, November.
    10. Xian Cheng & Shaoyi Liao & Zhongsheng Hua, 2017. "A policy of picking up parcels for express courier service in dynamic environments," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(9), pages 2470-2488, May.
    11. Mariia Petryk & Michael Rivera & Siddharth Bhattacharya & Liangfei Qiu & Subodha Kumar, 2022. "How Network Embeddedness Affects Real-Time Performance Feedback: An Empirical Investigation," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1467-1489, December.
    12. Noam Koriat & Roy Gelbard, 2018. "Knowledge Sharing Motivation Among External and Internal IT Workers," Journal of Information & Knowledge Management (JIKM), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(03), pages 1-24, September.
    13. Zichun Yan & Kai Wang & Ze-Yu Wang & Jian Yu & Sang-Bing Tsai & Guodong Li, 2018. "Agricultural Internet Entrepreneurs’ Social Network Behaviors and Entrepreneurship Financing Performance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-17, July.
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    15. Sukruth Suresh & T. Ravichandran, 2022. "Value Gains in Business Process Outsourcing: The Vendor Perspective," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 677-690, April.

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