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High Tech for a Higher Authority: The Placement of Graduating Rabbis from Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion

Author

Listed:
  • Lawrence Bodin

    (R. H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742)

  • Aaron Panken

    (Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion, New York, New York 10012)

Abstract

We describe the new placement process used to match the graduating rabbis from Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion (HUC-JIR) with congregations. The students involved in this new placement process are scheduled to be ordained as rabbis from HUC-JIR in May, about one month after the placement process is completed, and most students begin their pulpit assignments in July. Embedded in the new placement process are the double-blind match procedure and the double-blind match procedure for couples. These procedures, which we adapted from the procedure used to assign medical school graduates to internships, have been used successfully for placing the graduating rabbinical students at HUC-JIR since 1997.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence Bodin & Aaron Panken, 2003. "High Tech for a Higher Authority: The Placement of Graduating Rabbis from Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 1-11, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:33:y:2003:i:3:p:1-11
    DOI: 10.1287/inte.33.3.1.16013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    2. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Ethics and market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 705-720.
    2. Sharan Srinivas & Mohammadmahdi Alizadeh & Nathaniel D.Bastian, 2017. "Optimizing Student Team and Job Assignments for the Holy Family Academy," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 47(2), pages 163-174, April.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Dan Shrimpton & Alexandra M. Newman, 2005. "The US Army Uses a Network Optimization Model to Designate Career Fields for Officers," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 35(3), pages 230-237, June.

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    Keywords

    Organizational studies: personnel;

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