Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Un modelo de entrada y competencia en telecomunicaciones

Contents:

Author Info

  • Xavier Mancero

    ()
    (CEPAL, Santiago, Chile)

  • Eduardo Saavedra

    ()
    (ILADES/Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile.)

Abstract

Liberalization in telecommunications has led to market competition even at local telephony level. This article deals with a competitor’s decision to enter the market, with the later competition in prices, and with the consumers’ decision to choose their provider. We assume a deregulated market with a credible theat of hard re-regulation in the case that prices go beyond a maximum cap. The government set this price cap before the enter occurs. The main result of this work refers to the fact that the new company will cover not above 40% of the market; meaning that potential entry and facilities based competiton will produce a market with companies of different sizes. We also find that the entry policy with asymmetric access charges, favorable to the entrant, would only increase the entrant’s equilibrium coverage to the extent mentioned, a policy paid by consumers because prices increase in equilibrium. In terms of efficiency the assisted entry produce welfare loss for both consumers and society at large.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/53
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its journal Revista de Analisis Economico.

Volume (Year): 21 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 29-57

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ila:anaeco:v:21:y:2006:i:1:p:29-57

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Erasmo Escala 1835, 6500620 Santiago
Phone: (562) 692-0265
Fax: (562) 692-0303
Email:
Web page: http://www.economia.uahurtado.cl/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Esencial facilities; entry; access princing; telecomunications;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, 1983. "Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 315-325, Autumn.
  2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring.
  3. Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Douglas M. Dunn & William H. Williams & W. Allen Spivey, 1971. "Analysis and Prediction of Telephone Demand in Local Geographical Areas," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(2), pages 561-576, Autumn.
  5. Park, Rolla Edward & Wetzel, Bruce M & Mitchell, Bridger M, 1983. "Price Elasticities for Local Telephone Calls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1699-730, November.
  6. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 1999. "Interconnection in Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
  8. Vickers, John, 1995. "Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 1-17, January.
  9. Manuel Ángel Abdala & José Luis Arrufat & Rinaldo Colome, 1996. "Elasticidades de Demanda de Servicio Telefónico Básico en Argentina," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 33(100), pages 397-424.
  10. Eduardo Saavedra & Xavier Mancero, . "Entry, Cream Skimming, and Competition: Theory and Simulation for Chile's Local Telephony Market," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv132, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  12. Mitchell, Bridger M, 1978. "Optimal Pricing of Local Telephone Service," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 517-37, September.
  13. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
  14. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ila:anaeco:v:21:y:2006:i:1:p:29-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcela Perticara).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.