What Factors Drive Takeovers in Australia?
AbstractWe examine the relationships between the wealth changes associated with a takeover announcement to distinguish between three major competing motives¡Xsynergy, hubris, and agency. Empirical tests indicate that the synergy motive is the predominant explanation for the majority of takeovers in Australia; however, the evidence is consistent with the simultaneous presence of hubris in value-creating takeovers. The evidence also suggests agency, not hubris, is the primary motivation for the takeovers which result in value destruction.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 9 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
takeovers; synergy; agency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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