Mergers and Acquisitions in Mixed-Oligopoly Markets
AbstractThis paper develops an oligopoly model with firms that may potentially be state-owned or privately owned and solves it for different cases in which the number and ownership of those firms vary. The results are then compared in terms of total surplus and consumer surplus, and this comparison produces implications for the antitrust appraisal of possible mergers and acquisitions. It follows that certain types of mergers are unambiguously favorable or unfavorable from the point of view of their contribution to both total and consumer surplus, while others may be beneficial in one of those dimensions but harmful in the other dimension.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
mergers and acquisitions; mixed oligopoly; public enterprise;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
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