Competition between Nonprofit and For-Profit Firms
AbstractThis paper considers a nonprofit firm competing against a for-profit firm in a homogenous goods market. Given a stochastic demand function and an asymmetric tax schedule, we derive Cournot-Nash equilibrium allowing the nonprofit firm to have an altruistic preference toward consumer surplus or total surplus. The effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes are analyzed thereof.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
nonprofit; asymmetric taxation; stochastic demand; Cournot-Nash equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
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