A Stackelberg Model Of Child Support And Welfare
AbstractThis article models the child support and welfare decisions of never-married parents on welfare as a Stackelberg game. The mother chooses whether to exit welfare, report paternity, and to obtain a formal child support order. If a child support order is obtained, the father chooses whether to comply with the order. Simulation results from the structural parameters indicate that increasing the child support disregard increases paternal compliance slightly and affects maternal paternity reporting more significantly; effects are limited, however, by low paternal incomes. Results also indicate that high award amounts can decrease expected child support payments to women on welfare. Copyright �2008 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 49 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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- Marco Francesconi & Helmut Rainer & Wilbert van der Klaauw, 2009.
"Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform: The Case of Divorced Parents,"
CRIEFF Discussion Papers
0901, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- Francesconi, Marco & Rainer, Helmut & van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2008. "Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform: The Case of Divorced Parents," IZA Discussion Papers 3891, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Francesconi, Marco & Rainer, Helmut & Van Der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2008. "Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform: The Case of Divorced Parents," CEPR Discussion Papers 7107, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Urvi Neelakantan, 2009. "The impact of changes in child support policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 641-663, July.
- Brandeanna Allen & John Nunley & Alan Seals, 2011.
"The Effect of Joint-Child-Custody Legislation on the Child-Support Receipt of Single Mothers,"
Journal of Family and Economic Issues,
Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 124-139, March.
- Allen, Brandeanna & Nunley, John & Seals, Alan, 2008. "The Effect of Joint-Child-Custody Legislation on the Child-Support Receipt of Single Mothers," MPRA Paper 16316, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
- Terry-Ann L. Craigie, 2010. "Child Support Transfers under Family Complexity," Working Papers 1276, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Research on Child Wellbeing..
- Roff, Jennifer & Lugo-Gil, Julieta, 2012. "A model of child support and the underground economy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 668-681.
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