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Wage Posting in Two-Sided Search and the Minimum Wage

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Author Info
Masters, Adrian M

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Abstract

This article focuses on wage formation in an equilibrium (two-sided) model of search with match-specific heterogeneity. Despite a large number (a continuum) of employers, search provides sufficient isolation to generate market power. By posting wages, employers, without collusion, capture most of the surplus that accrues to any match. The equilibrium wage is below that which maximizes employment. An example, using calibrated parameter values, is used to reconcile some recent, otherwise contradictory empirical results on the employment effects of minimum wage adjustments. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 809-26
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:4:p:809-26

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  1. Adrian Masters, 2004. "Firm level hiring policy with culturally biased testing," Discussion Papers 04-14, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cahuc, Pierre & Laroque, Guy, 2007. "Optimal Taxation and Monopsonistic Labour Market: Does Monopsony Justify the Minimum Wage?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6416, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Ken Burdett & Randall Wright, 1998. "Two-Sided Search with Nontransferable Utility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 220-245, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Adrian Masters, 2008. "Marriage, Commitment and Divorce in a Matching Model with Differential Aging," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 614-628, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Adrian Masters, 2005. "Directed Search without Wage Commitment and the Role of Labor Market Institutions," Discussion Papers 05-02, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. A. Masters & A. Muthoo, 2003. "Ex Ante Price Commitment with Renegotiation in a Dynamic Market," Economics Discussion Papers 555, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael Sattinger, 2003. "A Kaldor Matching Model of Real Wage Declines," Discussion Papers 03-04, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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