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Directed Search without Wage Commitment and the Role of Labor Market Institutions

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Author Info
Adrian Masters

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Abstract

An urn-ball matching model of directed search is analyzed in which the usual assumption of commitment to posted wages is dropped. One-on-one matches lead to a Nash bargained wage but when multiple applicants arrive competition drives the workers down to their continuation value. A minimum wage can act as a commitment device when (as in the USA) willful underpayment carries a stiffer penalty than "inadvertetn underpayment. The theory sheds new light on why firms appear to voluntarily bind themselves into paying higher wages than they would otherwise pay. Robustness to various sources of heterogeneity is considered

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Paper provided by University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 05-02.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:05-02

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Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A.
Phone: (518) 442-4735
Fax: (518) 442-4736

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Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A.
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Web: http://www.albany.edu/econ/dp/index.html

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  1. Moen, Espen R, 2002. "Do Good Workers Hurt Bad Workers - or is it the Other Way Around?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3471, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard Rogerson & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2005. "Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(4), pages 959-988, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Masters, Adrian M, 1999. "Wage Posting in Two-Sided Search and the Minimum Wage," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 809-26, November.
    Other versions:
  5. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
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  6. John Kennes & Benoit Julien & Ian King, 2002. "The Mortensen Rule and Efficient Coordination Unemployment," Macroeconomics 0206001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  7. James Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2006. "Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(4), pages 869-891, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Ashenfelter, Orley & Smith, Robert S, 1979. "Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 333-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. B. Petrongolo & Z. Eckstein & S. Ge, 2005. "Minimum Wage and Compliance in a Model of Search On-the-Job," 2005 Meeting Papers 76, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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