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Research on Construction Waste Recycling Subsidy Model Considering Contractor’s Environmental Awareness

Author

Listed:
  • Ruwen Tan

    (College of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China)

  • Huan Jin

    (College of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China)

  • Minjiu Yu

    (College of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China)

  • Jingsong Yang

    (College of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China)

  • Jing Zhang

    (College of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China)

Abstract

Considering the environmental awareness of contractors, this paper constructs a construction material supply chain consisting of the government, a manufacturer, and a contractor, analyzes the decision-making and influencing factors of various stakeholders under no subsidy, contractor subsidy, and manufacturer subsidy, and studies the formulation of subsidy policies for construction waste recycling from the perspective of the government. The results show that: compared with subsidizing the manufacturer, when the government subsidizes the contractor, the recycling rate is lower, and the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare are higher. The manufacturer will use the price mechanism to grab government subsidies at this time, which will increase governmental subsidy expenditure. We also show that the recycling cost and the environmental awareness of the contractor affect the decision-making of the government and the manufacturer in different ways. Therefore, the government should analyze the contractor’s environmental awareness and evaluate the manufacturer’s recycling cost before formulating subsidy policies to promote construction waste recycling.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruwen Tan & Huan Jin & Minjiu Yu & Jingsong Yang & Jing Zhang, 2023. "Research on Construction Waste Recycling Subsidy Model Considering Contractor’s Environmental Awareness," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-16, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:2333-:d:1048408
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2015. "Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(8), pages 1346-1357, August.
    4. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    5. Begum, Rawshan Ara & Siwar, Chamhuri & Pereira, Joy Jacqueline & Jaafar, Abdul Hamid, 2009. "Attitude and behavioral factors in waste management in the construction industry of Malaysia," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 321-328.
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