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A Decentralized Auction Model for Sustainable Housing Rental Market

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  • Qinghui Guan

    (School of Finance, 369 Sangdo-ro, Dongjak-gu, Seoul 06978, Republic of Korea)

  • Huisu Jang

    (School of Finance, 369 Sangdo-ro, Dongjak-gu, Seoul 06978, Republic of Korea)

Abstract

The Internet of Things has driven the transformation of the traditional offline rental model to online rental platforms such as Zillow, Zigbang, and Lianjia. These platforms provide abundant housing options, detailed information, convenient communication, and greater price transparency. However, existing online rental platforms are still centralized and rely on third-party intermediaries for settlement, which raises concerns about the integrity of real estate data, transaction security, and price transparency. To improve the real estate leasing business, we propose leveraging the decentralized nature of blockchain technology. By eliminating intermediaries, we can ensure customer privacy and reduce transaction costs. This strategy revolves around smart contracts as a core component, automatically matching landlords and tenants based on their offers, achieving transparency, and maintaining anonymity for both parties. We introduce a novel auction system that combines the features of interactive auctions and sealed-bid auctions, enabling landlords and tenants to engage in range bidding. In this study, we developed a detailed algorithm to define how smart contracts function during the auction process. Through a cost analysis, we demonstrate the economic feasibility and provide a secure, transparent, and reliable approach for online auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Qinghui Guan & Huisu Jang, 2023. "A Decentralized Auction Model for Sustainable Housing Rental Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(21), pages 1-19, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:21:p:15467-:d:1271351
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yu, Yugang & Dong, Yuxuan & Guo, Xiaolong, 2018. "Pricing for sales and per-use rental services with vertical differentiation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 270(2), pages 586-598.
    2. Syed Mithun Ali & Andrea Appolloni & Fausto Cavallaro & Idiano D’Adamo & Assunta Di Vaio & Francesco Ferella & Massimo Gastaldi & Muhammad Ikram & Nallapaneni Manoj Kumar & Michael Alan Martin & Abdul, 2023. "Development Goals towards Sustainability," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-11, June.
    3. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
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