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Empirical Research on EPR Practices Performance and Governance Mechanism from the Perspective of Green Supply Chain

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  • Xin Lu

    (Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China)

  • Fangchao Xu

    (Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China)

Abstract

The performance of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) plays a very important role in guiding enterprises’ choice of EPR practices. Meanwhile, suppliers’ behavior and green operations may influence manufacturers’ social image and operations. Thus, governance mechanisms for suppliers may impact the performance of EPR practices. Therefore, from the perspective of supply chain governance, this paper first studies the relationship of manufacturers’ EPR practices and operation performance and then introduces three types of supplier governance mechanisms (contract governance, relationship governance and equity governance) to explore the influences on manufacturers’ performance. Survey data collected from enterprises in the electronics industry in China show the relationship between manufacturers’ EPR practices and performance, as well as the effect of the three proposed governance mechanisms on the performance of EPR practices. The conclusions obtained in this study suggest that manufacturers’ EPR practices can significantly improve their environmental and market performances. At the same time, manufacturers can adjust their operation performance according to the choice of supplier governance mechanism, which is chosen based on the operation objectives of the enterprises. To be specific, if the enterprises want to obtain better environmental performance and improve their social image, they should choose a contract governance mechanism that explicitly stipulates the responsibility and obligation of the supplier. In addition, the three proposed governance mechanisms can improve the market performance of enterprises in EPR practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Xin Lu & Fangchao Xu, 2018. "Empirical Research on EPR Practices Performance and Governance Mechanism from the Perspective of Green Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-17, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:12:p:4374-:d:185057
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    Cited by:

    1. Wenming Sun & Leilei Jiang & Ke Dong, 2023. "Research on Supply Chain Coordination Decision Model Based on Green Technology," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(3), pages 21582440231, August.

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