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The Shifting Shape of Risk: Endogenous Market Failure for Insurance

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  • Thomas G. Koch

    (Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, USA)

Abstract

This article considers an economy where risk is insurable, but selection determines the pool of individuals who take it up. First, we demonstrate that the comparative statics of these economies do not necessarily depend on its marginal selection (adverse versus favorable), but rather other characteristics. We then use repeated cross-sections of medical expenditures in the U.S. to understand the role of changes in the medical risk distribution on the fraction of Americans without medical insurance. We find that both the level and the shape of the distribution of risk are important in determining the equilibrium quantity of insurance. Symmetric changes in risk (e.g., shifts in the price of medical care) better explain the shifting insurance rate over time. Asymmetric changes (e.g., associated with a shifting age distribution) are not as important.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas G. Koch, 2017. "The Shifting Shape of Risk: Endogenous Market Failure for Insurance," Risks, MDPI, vol. 5(1), pages 1-13, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jrisks:v:5:y:2017:i:1:p:9-:d:88917
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charpentier, Arthur & Le Maux, Benoît, 2014. "Natural catastrophe insurance: How should the government intervene?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 1-17.
    2. repec:hal:journl:hal-00536925 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2007. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 745-788, June.
    4. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    5. Jonathan Gruber & Helen Levy, 2009. "The Evolution of Medical Spending Risk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(4), pages 25-48, Fall.
    6. Carolyn Kousky & Roger Cooke, 2012. "Explaining the Failure to Insure Catastrophic Risks," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 37(2), pages 206-227, April.
    7. J. David Cummins, 2006. "Should the government provide insurance for catastrophes?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Jul), pages 337-380.
    8. Thomas G. Koch, 2014. "Bankruptcy, Medical Insurance, And A Law With Unintended Consequences," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(11), pages 1326-1339, November.
    9. Emmanuel Saez, 2004. "Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960–2000: Evidence and Policy Implications," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 18, pages 117-174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Favorable Selection with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(3), pages 535-539.
    11. Carl M. Harris, 1968. "The Pareto Distribution as a Queue Service Discipline," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 307-313, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. CATRINA, Ersilia, 2018. "Insurance, A Guaranteed Risk Or A Risk Assumed?," MPRA Paper 87769, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2018.
    2. Luca Regis, 2017. "Special Issue “Actuarial and Financial Risks in Life Insurance, Pensions and Household Finance”," Risks, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-2, December.
    3. Ersilia CATRINA, 2018. "Insurance, A Guaranteed Risk Or A Risk Assumed?," Junior Scientific Researcher, SC Research Publishing SRL, vol. 4(1), pages 121-133, May.

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