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Relative Symmetric Reductions under Multi-Choice Non-Transferable-Utility Situations

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  • Yu-Hsien Liao

    (Department of Applied Mathematics, National Pingtung University, Pingtung City 900391, Taiwan)

Abstract

In many game-theoretical results, the reduction axiom and its converse have been regarded as important requirements under axiomatic processes for solutions. However, it is shown that the replicated core counters a specific (inferior) converse reduction axiom under multi-choice non-transferable-utility situations. Thus, two modified reductions and relative properties of the reduction axiom and its converse are proposed to characterize the replicated core in this article.The main methods and relative results are as follows. First, two different types of reductions are proposed by focusing on both participants and participation levels under relative symmetric reducing behavior. Further, relative reduction axioms and their converse are adopted to characterize the replicated core.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu-Hsien Liao, 2022. "Relative Symmetric Reductions under Multi-Choice Non-Transferable-Utility Situations," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-7, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:10:y:2022:i:5:p:682-:d:755958
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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