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Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network

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  • Alison Watts

    (Department of Economics, Southern Illinois Univeristy, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA)

Abstract

We consider the problem of how to apply a generalized second price (GSP) auction to a buyer–seller network. GSP auctions are often used to sell online ads where buyers care about the position or placement of the ad. GSP auctions can also be applied to wireless data transmissions with congestion where buyers care about the speed of data transmission; however, such an auction would take place over a network as a buyer could only purchase from a seller (or cell tower) that he was linked to (or was close to). Two GSP auctions over a network are considered: separate GSP auctions, and integrated GSP auctions with pauses. The efficiency of these auctions is examined with efficiency favoring the integrated auction with pauses.

Suggested Citation

  • Alison Watts, 2018. "Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-11, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:3:p:67-:d:168603
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    GSP auctions; networks;

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