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Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures

Author

Listed:
  • Nageswara S. V. Rao

    (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831, USA)

  • Chris Y. T. Ma

    (Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong, China)

  • Fei He

    (The Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, Texas A&M University, Kingsville, TX 78363, USA)

  • David K. Y. Yau

    (Department of Computer Science, Singapore University of Technology and Design, 8 Somapah Road, Singapore 487372, Singapore)

  • Jun Zhuang

    (Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA)

Abstract

In certain critical infrastructures, correlations between cyber and physical components can be exploited to launch strategic attacks, so that disruptions to one component may affect others and possibly the entire infrastructure. Such correlations must be explicitly taken into account in ensuring the survival of the infrastructure. For large discrete infrastructures characterized by the number of cyber and physical components, we characterize the cyber–physical interactions at two levels: (i) the cyber–physical failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of the cyber sub-infrastructure given that of the physical sub-infrastructure (both specified by their marginal probabilities), and (ii) individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions expressed in terms of their multiplier functions. We formulate an abstract problem of ensuring the survival probability of a cyber–physical infrastructure with discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, whose utility functions are composed of infrastructure survival probability terms and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure survival probability on cost terms, correlation functions, multiplier functions, and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. We apply these analytical results to characterize the defense postures of simplified models of metro systems, cloud computing infrastructures, and smart power grids.

Suggested Citation

  • Nageswara S. V. Rao & Chris Y. T. Ma & Fei He & David K. Y. Yau & Jun Zhuang, 2018. "Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-24, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:3:p:52-:d:159547
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mohammad E. Nikoofal & Jun Zhuang, 2012. "Robust Allocation of a Defensive Budget Considering an Attacker's Private Information," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(5), pages 930-943, May.
    2. Jenelius, Erik & Westin, Jonas & Holmgren, Åke J., 2010. "Critical infrastructure protection under imperfect attacker perception," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 16-26.
    3. Gerald Brown & Matthew Carlyle & Javier Salmerón & Kevin Wood, 2006. "Defending Critical Infrastructure," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 36(6), pages 530-544, December.
    4. Xiaojun Shan & Jun Zhuang, 2013. "Cost of Equity in Homeland Security Resource Allocation in the Face of a Strategic Attacker," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(6), pages 1083-1099, June.
    5. Kjell Hausken, 2011. "Strategic defense and attack of series systems when agents move sequentially," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(7), pages 483-504.
    6. Shan, Xiaojun & Zhuang, Jun, 2013. "Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender–attacker game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 262-272.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fei He & Jun Zhuang & Nageswara S. V. Rao, 2020. "Discrete game-theoretic analysis of defense in correlated cyber-physical systems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 294(1), pages 741-767, November.
    2. Pramod C. Mane & Nagarajan Krishnamurthy & Kapil Ahuja, 2019. "Formation of Stable and Efficient Social Storage Cloud," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-17, November.

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