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Fighting for Routes: Resource Allocation among Competing Planners in Transportation Networks

Author

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  • Charlotte Roman

    (Mathematics Institute, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK)

  • Paolo Turrini

    (Department of Computer Science, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK)

Abstract

In transportation networks, incomplete information is ubiquitous, and users often delegate their route choice to distributed route planners. To model and study these systems, we introduce network control games, consisting of multiple actors seeking to optimise the social welfare of their assigned subpopulations through resource allocation in an underlying nonatomic congestion game. We first analyse the inefficiency of the routing equilibria by calculating the Price of Anarchy for polynomial cost functions, and then, using an Asynchronous Advantage Actor–Critic algorithm implementation, we show that reinforcement learning agents are vulnerable to choosing suboptimal routing as predicted by the theory. Finally, we extend the analysis to allow vehicles to choose their route planner and study the associated equilibria. Our results can be applied to mitigate inefficiency issues arising in large transport networks with route controlled autonomous vehicles.

Suggested Citation

  • Charlotte Roman & Paolo Turrini, 2023. "Fighting for Routes: Resource Allocation among Competing Planners in Transportation Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-19, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:3:p:37-:d:1135057
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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