Risk and return of publicly held versus privately owned banks
AbstractThe author divides bank holding companies (BHCs) into four size classes, then categorizes each class according to public or private ownership. He compares the performance and risk across bank size classes between 1986 and 2000 and in five-year windows therein. For the largest BHCs, returns on assets and operating costs do not depend on ownership, but for the smaller BHCs, returns on assets are lower and operating costs are higher for those that are publicly owned. Small public BHCs also hold more capital than do small private ones.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its journal Economic Policy Review.
Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): Sep ()
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