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Economizing on liquidity with deferred settlement mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Kurt Johnson
  • James J. McAndrews
  • Kimmo Soramaki

Abstract

Credit extensions to banks using the Fedwire Funds Service-the Federal Reserve's real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payments system-can reach intraday peaks as high as $86 billion. This article evaluates the effectiveness of alternative methods of settling Fedwire payments in reducing intraday credit extensions. The authors simulate three deferred settlement mechanisms that complement RTGS systems: one-hour netting, six-hour netting, and a mechanism called a receipt-reactive gross settlement (RRGS) system. Their results suggest that in conjunction with RTGS systems, the RRGS mechanism could significantly reduce daylight credit extensions while modestly delaying the average time of payment settlement. Moreover, certain features of RRGS systems may encourage banks to submit payments earlier in the day. Further research on RRGS systems may shed light on whether they could prove to be a true liquidity-saving complement to real-time gross settlement systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurt Johnson & James J. McAndrews & Kimmo Soramaki, 2004. "Economizing on liquidity with deferred settlement mechanisms," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 51-72.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2004:i:dec:p:51-72:n:v.10no.3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:zbw:bofrdp:1999_016 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Angelini, Paolo, 1998. "An analysis of competitive externalities in gross settlement systems," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. William Roberds, 1993. "The rise of electronic payments networks and the future role of the Fed with regard to payment finality," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Mar, pages 1-22.
    4. Bech, Morten L. & Garratt, Rod, 2003. "The intraday liquidity management game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 198-219, April.
    5. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2001_009 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. James J. McAndrews & Samira Rajan, 2000. "The timing and funding of Fedwire funds transfers," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul, pages 17-32.
    7. repec:zbw:bofism:1998_014 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin, Antoine & McAndrews, James, 2010. "A study of competing designs for a liquidity-saving mechanism," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1818-1826, August.
    2. Galbiati, Marco & Soramaki, Kimmo, 2010. "Liquidity-saving mechanisms and bank behaviour," Bank of England working papers 400, Bank of England.
    3. Denbee, Edward & Norman, Ben, 2010. "The impact of payment splitting on liquidity requirements in RTGS," Bank of England working papers 404, Bank of England.
    4. Enghin Atalay & Antoine Martin & James J. McAndrews, 2008. "The welfare effects of a liquidity-saving mechanism," Staff Reports 331, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Martin, Antoine & McAndrews, James, 2008. "Liquidity-saving mechanisms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 554-567, April.
    6. Bernardo Bravo-Benitez & Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova & Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo, 2016. "Centrality Measurement of the Mexican Large Value Payments System from the Perspective of Multiplex Networks," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 47(1), pages 19-47, January.
    7. Antoine Martin & James J. McAndrews, 2008. "An economic analysis of liquidity-saving mechanisms," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 14(Sep), pages 25-39.
    8. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
    9. Alexandrova-Kabadjova Biliana & Solís-Robleda Francisco, 2013. "Managing Intraday Liquidity: The Mexican Experience," Working Papers 2013-01, Banco de México.

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