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Liquidity-saving mechanisms in collateral-based RTGS payment systems

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  • Marius Jurgilas
  • Antoine Martin

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple mechanism of capital taxation that is negatively correlated with labor supply. Using a life-cycle model of heterogeneous agents, I show that this tax scheme provides a strong work incentive when households possess large assets and high productivity later in the life cycle, when they would otherwise work less. This reformed system also adds to the saving motive and raises aggregate capital. Moreover, the increased economic activities expand the tax base, and the revenue-neutral reform results in a lower average tax rate. My findings show that this tax scheme improves long-run welfare and that the majority of current generations would experience a welfare gain from a transition to the reformed system.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 438.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:438

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Keywords: Payment systems ; Bank liquidity;

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  1. Angelini, Paolo, 1998. "An analysis of competitive externalities in gross settlement systems," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, January.
  2. Galbiati, Marco & Soramaki, Kimmo, 2010. "Liquidity-saving mechanisms and bank behaviour," Bank of England working papers 400, Bank of England.
  3. Bech, Morten L. & Garratt, Rod, 2003. "The intraday liquidity management game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 198-219, April.
  4. Angelini, Paolo, 2000. "Are Banks Risk Averse? Intraday Timing of Operations in the Interbank Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(1), pages 54-73, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Clara Lia Machado & Carlos León & Miguel Sarmiento & Orlando Chipatecua, 2010. "Riesgo Sistémico y Estabilidad del Sistema de Pagos de Alto Valor en Colombia: Análisis bajo Topología de Redes y Simulación de Pagos," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 007669, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.

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