Does Tax Debt Capacity Matttter?
AbstractNordic corporations to a large extent both pay corporate tax and abstain from utilizing their depreciation allowances to the maximum extent possible. In this paper, we attempt to explain the empirical observation that most firms fails to maximize their tax usage. The model employed takes into account the argument that shareholders for some non-tax reasons have a preference for dividends over retained earnings. Furthermore, we also investigate whether a policy of not claiming the maximum amount of depreciation allowances could be value maximizing for the firm.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 22 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
- G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
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