Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

On the Redistributive Effect of Upper Benefit Limits in Bismarckian Social Insurance

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andreas Bergh

    (Department of Economics, Lund University, Sweden)

Abstract

This paper examines the redistributive effect of upper benefit limits (“ceilings”) in short term Bismarckian social insurance. Using data describing the Swedish sickness benefit we show that ceilings create a small redistribution at fairly high costs in terms of total utility and political sustainability. The simulation suggests that social insurance schemes with ceilings are politically more vulnerable to competition from private insurance markets than social insurance where the same amount of redistribution is produced by progressive taxes or higher universal benefits.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi/images/stories/fep/fep22004_bergh.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 17 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 73-78

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:17:y:2004:i:2:p:73-78

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March.
  2. Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., 2001. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," CORE Discussion Papers 2001031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 1998. " The Political Economy of Targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 177-200, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Andreas Bergh, 2008. "Explaining the Survival of the Swedish Welfare State: Maintaining Political Support Through Incremental Change," Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 32(3), pages 233-254.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:17:y:2004:i:2:p:73-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Secretary).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.