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A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union

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  • Koch, Svea

Abstract

This paper asks how political conditionality needs to be conceptualized and researched to reflect global changes. It argues that a diversification of political conditionality “beyond aid” is now taking place. Political conditionality reaches across different external policy fields and includes cooperative and punitive measures. It has also moved from political rights toward social and environmental rights. To capture this diversification conceptually, the article presents an ideal–typical typology that is then refined based on the example of the European Union (EU). A review of the literature on EU political conditionality reveals a gap in studying the interaction of different political conditionality instruments.

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  • Koch, Svea, 2015. "A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 97-108.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:97-108
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.01.006
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    1. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
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    Cited by:

    1. Katharina Meissner, 2023. "How to sanction international wrongdoing? The design of EU restrictive measures," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 61-85, January.
    2. Borchert, Ingo & Conconi, Paola & Di Ubaldo, Mattia & Herghelegiu, Cristina, 2021. "The Pursuit of Non-Trade Policy Objectives in EU Trade Policy," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(5), pages 623-647, December.
    3. Sonja Grimm & Okka Lou Mathis, 2018. "Democratization via aid? The European Union’s democracy promotion in the Western Balkans 1994–2010," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(1), pages 163-184, March.
    4. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    5. Matteo Fiorini & Bernard Hoekman, 2017. "Economic Governance, Regulation and Services Trade Liberalization," RSCAS Working Papers 2017/27, European University Institute.
    6. Katharina L. Meissner & Clara Portela, 2022. "Beyond Foreign Policy? EU Sanctions at the Intersection of Development, Trade, and CFSP," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-4.
    7. Hackenesch, Christine, 2015. "It’s Domestic Politics, Stupid! EU Democracy Promotion Strategies Meet African Dominant Party Regimes," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 85-96.
    8. de Felice, Damiano, 2015. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 26-45.
    9. Baydag, Rena Melis & Klingebiel, Stephan & Marschall, Paul, 2018. "Shaping the patterns of aid allocation: a comparative analysis of seven bilateral donors and the European Union," IDOS Discussion Papers 22/2018, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    10. Thilo Bodenstein & Jörg Faust, 2017. "Who Cares? European Public Opinion on Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(5), pages 955-973, September.
    11. Souha El Khanji, 2022. "Donors’ Interest in Water and Sanitation Subsectors," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(2), pages 611-654, April.
    12. Del Biondo, Karen, 2015. "Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 74-84.
    13. Jan Orbie & Sarah Delputte & Fabienne Bossuyt & Petra Debusscher & Karen Del Biondo & Vicky Reynaert & Joren Verschaeve, 2017. "The Normative Distinctiveness of the European Union in International Development: Stepping Out of the Shadow of the World Bank?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 35(4), pages 493-511, July.
    14. Katharina L. Meissner, 2021. "Requesting Trade Sanctions? The European Parliament and the Generalized Scheme of Preferences," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 91-107, January.
    15. Menkes Jerzy, 2018. "Custom in International Economic Law," Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics, Sciendo, vol. 8(2), pages 188-203, December.
    16. Portela, Clara & Mora-Sanguinetti, Juan S., 2023. "Sanctions effectiveness, development and regime type. Are aid suspensions and economic sanctions alike?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    17. Reinsberg, Bernhard, 2015. "Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 46-61.
    18. Dasandi, Niheer & Erez, Lior, 2023. "The flag and the stick: Aid suspensions, human rights, and the problem of the complicit public," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).

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