Non-aviation revenues and their implications for airport regulation
AbstractThis paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.
Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600244/description#description
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- Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot, 2012. "No need to regulate airports with predominantly non-aeronautical revenues," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 52, pages 7.
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