Effectiveness of safety-based incentives in Public Private Partnerships: Evidence from the case of Spain
AbstractMany countries around the world are implementing Public–Private–Partnership (PPP) contacts to manage road infrastructure. In some of these contracts the public sector introduces economic incentives to the private operator to foster the accomplishment of social goals. One of the incentives that have been introduced in some PPP contracts is related to safety in such a way that the better the safety outcome the greater will be the economic reward to the contractor. The aim of this paper is at identify whether the incentives to improve road safety in highway PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios. To this end Poisson and negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from highway sections in Spain. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice.
Volume (Year): 46 (2012)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/547/description#description
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