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Object defense with preventive strike and false targets

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  • Wu, Di
  • Xiao, Hui
  • Peng, Rui

Abstract

In this paper, optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker are studied. The defender moves first, allocating its limited resources into three diverse measures: launching a preventive strike, building false targets, and protecting the genuine object. It is assumed that launching a preventive strike will expose the genuine object, thus during this measure the defender will not simultaneously build false targets. The attacker moves after observing the actions taken by the defender, allocating its resources into three measures: protecting its own base from a preventive strike, building false bases, and attacking the genuine object. For each of the defender's given strategies, the attacker tries to maximize the destruction probability of the genuine object. Comparing the expected vulnerability of the object, the defender decides whether to launch a preventive strike or build false targets. The strategies of the attacker and the defender are illustrated with numerical examples, and the optimal strategies are found.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Di & Xiao, Hui & Peng, Rui, 2018. "Object defense with preventive strike and false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 76-80.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:76-80
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2017.08.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Ding, Weiyong & Xu, Maochao & Huang, Yu & Zhao, Peng, 2020. "Cyber risks of PMU networks with observation errors: Assessment and mitigation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
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    4. Daniel Woods & Mustafa Abdallah & Saurabh Bagchi & Shreyas Sundaram & Timothy Cason, 2022. "Network defense and behavioral biases: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 254-286, February.
    5. Gao, Kaiye & Yan, Xiangbin & Liu, Xiang-dong & Peng, Rui, 2019. "Object defence of a single object with preventive strike of random effect," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 209-219.
    6. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ye, Yanqing & Tan, Yuejin, 2020. "How to protect a genuine target against an attacker trying to detect false targets," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 553(C).
    7. Wu, Di & Yan, Xiangbin & Peng, Rui & Wu, Shaomin, 2020. "Risk-attitude-based defense strategy considering proactive strike, preventive strike and imperfect false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    8. Wu, Di & Liu, Xiang-dong & Yan, Xiang-bin & Peng, Rui & Li, Gang, 2019. "Equilibrium analysis of bitcoin block withholding attack: A generalized model," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 318-328.
    9. Peng, Rui & Wu, Di & Xiao, Hui & Xing, Liudong & Gao, Kaiye, 2019. "Redundancy versus protection for a non-reparable phased-mission system subject to external impacts," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    10. Xiao, Hui & Lin, Chen & Kou, Gang & Peng, Rui, 2020. "Optimal resource allocation for defending k-out-of-n systems against sequential intentional and unintentional impacts," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    11. Lin, Chen & Xiao, Hui & Kou, Gang & Peng, Rui, 2020. "Defending a series system with individual protection, overarching protection, and disinformation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    12. Jalali, Sajjad & Seifbarghy, Mehdi & Niaki, Seyed Taghi Akhavan, 2018. "A risk-averse location-protection problem under intentional facility disruptions: A modified hybrid decomposition algorithm," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 196-219.
    13. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ding, Song & Ge, Bingfeng & Xia, Boyuan & Pedrycz, Witold, 2021. "Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    14. Dui, Hongyan & Meng, Xueyu & Xiao, Hui & Guo, Jianjun, 2020. "Analysis of the cascading failure for scale-free networks based on a multi-strategy evolutionary game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    15. Cao, Minhao & Guo, Jianjun & Xiao, Hui & Wu, Liang, 2022. "Reliability analysis and optimal generator allocation and protection strategy of a non-repairable power grid system," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    16. Lin, Chen & Xiao, Hui & Peng, Rui & Xiang, Yisha, 2021. "Optimal defense-attack strategies between M defenders and N attackers: A method based on cumulative prospect theory," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

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