We show that investor protection legislation is an important determinant of the returns of target companies that are subject to takeovers within Europe. Announcement and post-announcement returns are higher in strong investor protection countries, which indicates that bidders are forced to offer larger premiums when the original offer is made, and are more likely to have to revise their offer higher before a takeover is successful. This is consistent with targets having relatively greater bargaining power in strong investor protection environments. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of common determinants of takeover returns.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2009) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: 291-305 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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