Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 50 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 289-303
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:50:y:2003:i:1:p:289-303

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research

Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Ceyhun Bora Durdu & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2006. "Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops? A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff," IMF Working Papers 06/73, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ceyhun Bora Durdu & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2005. "Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?: A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff," NBER Working Papers 11178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Durdu, Ceyhun Bora & Mendoza, Enrique G., 2006. "Are asset price guarantees useful for preventing Sudden Stops?: A quantitative investigation of the globalization hazard-moral hazard tradeoff," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 84-119, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Ghosh, Saibal, 2005. "Evolving International Supervisory Architexture: Design, Rationale and Policy Reforms," MPRA Paper 17180, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
3. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Ashoka Mody & Se-Jik Kim, 2005. "Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs," IMF Working Papers 04/235, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
5. Se-Jik Kim, 2004. "Timing of International Bailouts," IMF Working Papers 04/9, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
6. Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes & Michael D. Bordo, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," IMF Working Papers 04/197, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Michael D. Bordo & Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," NBER Working Papers 10834, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Michael D. Bordo & Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(3), pages 421-450, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.