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Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF

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  • Michael D. Bordo
  • Ashoka Mody
  • Nienke Oomes

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the IMF's role in maintaining the access of emerging market economies to international capital markets. We find evidence that both macroeconomic aggregates and capital flows improve following the adoption of an IMF program, although they may initially deteriorate somewhat. Consistent with theoretical predictions and earlier empirical findings, we find that IMF programs are most successful in improving capital flows to countries with bad, but not very bad fundamentals. In such countries, IMF programs are also associated with improvements in the fundamentals themselves.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10834.

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Date of creation: Oct 2004
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Publication status: published as Michael D. Bordo & Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(3), pages 421-450, December.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10834

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  1. Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999. "Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CSGR Working papers series 35/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
  2. International Monetary Fund, 1998. "Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? a Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 98/169, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Hugh Rockoff & Michael D. Bordo, 1996. "The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval"," Departmental Working Papers 199528, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  4. Giancarlo Corsetti & Bernardo Guimaraes & Nouriel Roubini, 2003. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance," NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Marchesi, Silvia & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1999. "IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C111-25, March.
  6. Michael Mussa & Paul R. Masson, 1995. "Long-Term Tendencies in Budget Deficits and Debt," IMF Working Papers 95/128, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Michael M. Hutchison, . "A Cure Worse Than The Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 01-09, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  8. Zlata Hajro & Joseph Joyce, 2009. "A true test: do IMF programs hurt the poor?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 295-306.
  9. Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, 2000. "Measuring Real Economic Effects of Bailouts: Historical Perspectives on How Countries in Financial Distress Have Fared With and Without Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 7701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Lerrick, Adam & Meltzer, Allan H., 2003. "Blueprint for an international lender of last resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 289-303, January.
  11. Bordo Michael D. & Kydland Finn E., 1995. "The Gold Standard As a Rule: An Essay in Exploration," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 423-464, October.
  12. Diego Saravia & Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Catalyzing Capital Flows," IMF Working Papers 03/100, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Meltzer, Allan-H, 2002. "New International Financial Arrangements," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 20(S1), pages 11-22, December.
  14. Ales Bulir & Marianne Schulze-Gattas & Atish R. Ghosh & Alex Mourmouras & A. Javier Hamann & Timothy D. Lane, 2002. "IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises," IMF Occasional Papers 210, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Curzio Giannini & Carlo Cottarelli, 2002. "Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending," IMF Working Papers 02/193, International Monetary Fund.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Barry Eichengreen, 2005. "The IMF in a World of Private Capital Markets," Working Papers id:48, eSocialSciences.
  2. Carlos de Resende, 2007. "IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Catalytic Effect," Working Papers 07-22, Bank of Canada.
  3. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2007. "The Analysis of Catalysis: IMF Programs and Private Capital Flows," School of Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Surrey 0107, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  4. Bjoern Rother & Ivetta Hakobyan & Monica Baumgarten de Bolle, 2006. "The Level and Composition of Public Sector Debt in Emerging Market Crises," IMF Working Papers 06/186, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Jun Il Kim, 2006. "IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 06/156, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Rockoff, Hugh & White, Eugene N., 2012. "Monetary Regimes and Policy on a Global Scale: The Oeuvre of Michael D. Bordo," MPRA Paper 49672, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2013.
  7. Udaibir S. Das & Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, 2010. "Sovereign Default Risk and Private Sector Access to Capital in Emerging Markets," IMF Working Papers 10/10, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
  9. Jun Il Kim, 2007. "Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 07/104, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Stephen Nelson, 2010. "Does compliance matter? Assessing the relationship between sovereign risk and compliance with international monetary law," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 107-139, June.
  11. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2009. "Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 126-136, September.
  12. Uma Ramakrishnan & Juan Zalduendo, 2006. "The Role of IMF Support in Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 06/75, International Monetary Fund.

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