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A coloring property for stable allocations

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  • Halilović, Ajdin
  • Ţurcanu, Teodor

Abstract

We prove that in the stable allocations problem for a fixed vertex v there can be done a partition of the edges incident with v such that in any stable allocation there is at most one edge incident with v from each class. This is an improvement of the coloring theorem for stable b-matchings given in Fleiner (2003). We also extend our result to stable flows and allocations with choice functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Halilović, Ajdin & Ţurcanu, Teodor, 2016. "A coloring property for stable allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 65-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:80:y:2016:i:c:p:65-69
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October.
    2. Fleiner, Tamas, 2003. "On the stable b-matching polytope," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 149-158, October.
    3. Roth, Alvin E & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1989. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 559-570, May.
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