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Design principles for individual transferable quotas

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Author Info

  • Townsend, Ralph E.
  • McColl, James
  • Young, Michael D.

Abstract

Individual transferable quota (ITQ) institutions should be designed to minimize two types of transaction costs. First, to minimize the costs of transferring ITQ rights among rights-holders and users, rights should be separated into three components: a permanent entitlement share, an annual catch allocation, and a license to fish. Second, ITQ rights can reduce the transactions costs for development of self-governance by owners both by specifying a non-unanimous voting rule (preferably one-share/one-vote) and also by delineating clear standards for devolution of responsibility from government. These same two principles for reduction of transactions costs can be applied, with slight variation, to individual transferable input systems.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.

Volume (Year): 30 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 131-141

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Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:30:y:2006:i:2:p:131-141

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Related research

Keywords: Fisheries management Individual transferable quotas Transactions costs;

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Cited by:
  1. White, Lawrence J., 2006. "The Fishery as a Watery Commons: Lessons from the Experiences of Other Public Policy Areas for U.S. Fisheries Policy," Working paper 439, Regulation2point0.
  2. Townsend, Ralph E., 2010. "Transactions costs as an obstacle to fisheries self-governance in New Zealand," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), September.

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