Value capture in protected areas from the perspective of common-pool resource governance: A case study of Jiuzhai Valley National Park, China

Central government budgets are generally accepted as being a crucial source of financial support for most protected areas because the entire population is deemed to be the beneficiary of heritage protection. In value capture theory, however, the benefit redistribution (including value capture and compensation) inside protected areas also merits attention. In this paper, we first structure the value capture mechanism inside protected areas and compare four resource governance models (Leviathan, privatization, self-organized governance and self-organized governance in which local government intervenes) based on the capture approach, transaction cost and application condition. Theoretically, as a new resource governance model, self-organized governance in which local government intervenes is more suitable for the value capture of protected areas in developing authoritarian countries. We use Jiuzhai Valley National Park in China as an empirical case study. After reviewing the institutional changes and value capture mechanism, we evaluate the equity and benefit of value capture in Jiuzhai Valley National Park and argue that self-organized governance in which local government intervenes achieves the goals of social justice and heritage protection.