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Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants

Author

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  • Heo, Eun Jeong
  • Hong, Sunghoon
  • Chun, Youngsub

Abstract

A recent development of immunosuppressive protocols (or simply, suppressants) offers a new option to patients suffering from end-stage renal disease: transplants from biologically incompatible donors. Suppressants are currently being used for direct transplants within patient–donor pairs, but they can be utilized more efficiently when combined with kidney exchanges. To assess the welfare gains from doing so, we introduce the “minimum chains algorithms” for different sizes of feasible exchanges. Using these algorithms, we calculate the minimal number of suppressants needed for transplants for a group of patient–donor pairs. Our simulation results show that (i) a significant reduction of suppressants can be achieved by implementing this proposal, (ii) it suffices to arrange 2-way exchanges for the best use of suppressants, and (iii) the welfare gain varies with the ABO blood-type distribution, and the gain in Korea appears to be larger than that in the United States. Finally, we assess the value (or cost) of each patient–donor pair by comparing the outcomes of the pools with and without the pair.

Suggested Citation

  • Heo, Eun Jeong & Hong, Sunghoon & Chun, Youngsub, 2022. "Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:85:y:2022:i:c:s0167629622000698
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102650
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kidney exchange; Immunosuppressant; Minimum chains algorithm; Simulation analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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