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Bailing out conflicted sovereigns

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  • Calomiris, Charles W.
  • Tsoulouhas, Theofanis

Abstract

How should sovereign bailouts take account of the effects bailouts have on policy reforms? Conflicted recipient governments complicate bailout choices because some reforms that spur growth reduce rents that benefit government decision makers. Our model takes account of whether bailout generosity and policy reforms are strategic substitutes, strategic complements or both, and each case implies a different optimal bailout contract, which generally cannot achieve First Best. Conditional forgiveness of some loan payments when economic outcomes are sufficiently favorable can achieve outcomes closer to First Best, and this is so for a small ex ante amount of the bailout subsidy.

Suggested Citation

  • Calomiris, Charles W. & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2022. "Bailing out conflicted sovereigns," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:51:y:2022:i:c:s1042957322000328
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100979
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt; Rent seeking; Financial distress; Moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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