Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Do hedge funds trade on private information? Evidence from syndicated lending and short-selling

Contents:

Author Info

  • Massoud, Nadia
  • Nandy, Debarshi
  • Saunders, Anthony
  • Song, Keke

Abstract

This paper investigates an important contemporary issue relating to the involvement of hedge funds in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when hedge funds make syndicated loans and take short positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence consistent with the short-selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to public announcements of both loan originations and loan amendments. We also find that hedge funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, lower credit quality firms, where access to private information is potentially the most valuable and where trading on such information could lead to enhanced profits. Overall, our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulating the hedge fund industry.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-518TYG0-1/2/9cfad16cddf009301f8da32fd4648adb
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 99 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 477-499

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:99:y:2011:i:3:p:477-499

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

Related research

Keywords: Hedge funds Short-selling Private information Conflict of interest Syndicated loans;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Asquith, Paul & Gertner, Robert & Scharfstein, David, 1994. "Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 625-58, August.
  2. Andriy Bodnaruk & Massimo Massa & Andrei Simonov, 2009. "Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(12), pages 4989-5026, December.
  3. Mathias Dewatripont & Philippe Aghion & Patrick Rey, 1994. "Renegotiation design with unverifiable information," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9591, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  4. Acharya, Viral V & Johnson, Tim, 2005. "Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives," CEPR Discussion Papers 5180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Roberts, Michael R. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 159-184, August.
  6. Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January.
  7. Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2006. "Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2472, Yale School of Management, revised 11 Sep 2009.
  8. Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2008. "Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(4), pages 1635-1677, November.
  9. Sreedhar T. Bharath & Tyler Shumway, 2008. "Forecasting Default with the Merton Distance to Default Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(3), pages 1339-1369, May.
  10. Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 1659-1691, April.
  11. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  12. Amir Sufi, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 629-668, 04.
  13. Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, 2009. "On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2635-2672, July.
  14. Robert M. Bushman & Abbie J. Smith & Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, 2010. "Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(5), pages 921-972, December.
  15. John M. Griffin & Jin Xu, 2009. "How Smart Are the Smart Guys? A Unique View from Hedge Fund Stock Holdings," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2331-2370, July.
  16. Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, 2009. "Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1657-1695, 08.
  17. Nini, Greg & Smith, David C. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Creditor control rights and firm investment policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 400-420, June.
  18. Dennis, Steven A. & Mullineaux, Donald J., 2000. "Syndicated Loans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 404-426, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Lorsque les hedge funds prêtent à des entreprises ... pour ensuite parier à la baisse via de l'information privée !
    by contact@captaineconomics.fr (Le Captain') in Captain Economics on 2013-05-16 07:11:11
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Vikas Agarwal & Costanza Meneghetti, 2011. "The role of hedge funds as primary lenders," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 241-261, July.
  2. Shive, Sophie & Yun, Hayong, 2013. "Are mutual funds sitting ducks?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 220-237.
  3. Jongha Lim & Bernadette A. Minton & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "Equity-Holding Institutional Lenders: Do they Receive Better Terms?," NBER Working Papers 17856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Henk Berkman & Michael McKenzie & Patrick Verwijmeren, 2013. "Hole in the Wall: Informed Short Selling ahead of Private Placements," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-153/IV/62, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Chakrabarty, Bidisha & Shkilko, Andriy, 2013. "Information transfers and learning in financial markets: Evidence from short selling around insider sales," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1560-1572.
  6. Jongha Lim & Bernadette A. Minton & Michael Weisbach, 2012. "Syndicated Loan Spreads and the Composition of the Syndicate," NBER Working Papers 18356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. K. Stephen Haggard & (Grace) Qing Hao & Ying Jenny Zhang, 2012. "Are hedge funds guilty of manipulative short-selling?," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 38(11), pages 1048-1066, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:99:y:2011:i:3:p:477-499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.