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Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations

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  • Nicolaï, Jean-Philippe

Abstract

The present paper addresses two policy objectives: to implement a market for pollution permits and to make regulation acceptable for businesses. Profit-neutral permit allocations are defined as the number of permits that the regulator should give for free so that post-regulation profits (i.e. a firm's profits in the products market plus the value of the allowances granted for free) are equal to pre-regulation profits. The proposed model is developed by assuming that firms use polluting technologies and compete “à la Cournot”. The paper demonstrates that a low number of free allowances is sufficient to meet these two goals. Moreover, the regulator can fully offset losses, even when the reduction in emissions is high, provided that the sectors concerned are not monopolies, both for isoelastic and linear demand functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolaï, Jean-Philippe, 2019. "Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 239-253.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:93:y:2019:i:c:p:239-253
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.12.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Philippe Nicolaï & Jorge Zamorano, 2018. "Windfall Profits under Pollution Permits and Output-Based Allocation," Post-Print hal-03084183, HAL.
    2. Jean-Philippe Nicolaï & Jorge Zamorano, 2018. "Windfall Profits Under Pollution Permits and Output-Based Allocation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(4), pages 661-691, April.
    3. Ralf Martin & Mirabelle Mu?ls & Laure B. de Preux & Ulrich J. Wagner, 2014. "Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2482-2508, August.
    4. Fevrier, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2004. "Idiosyncratic shocks in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 835-848, June.
    5. Seade, J., 1985. "Profitable Cost Increases and the Shifting of Taxation: Equilibrium Responses of Markets in Oligopoly," Economic Research Papers 269225, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    6. Hepburn, Cameron J. & Quah, John K.-H. & Ritz, Robert A., 2013. "Emissions trading with profit-neutral permit allocations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 85-99.
    7. Seade, J, 1985. "Profitable Cost Increases and the Shifting of Taxation : Equilibrium Response of Markets in Oligopoly," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 260, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    8. Beat Hintermann, 2011. "Market Power, Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 49(3), pages 327-349, July.
    9. Beat Hintermann, 2016. "Pass-Through of CO2 Emission Costs to Hourly Electricity Prices in Germany," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 857-891.
    10. Beat Hintermann, 2017. "Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pollution permits; Cournot oligopoly; EU-ETS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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