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Private citizen suits and public enforcement: Substitutes or complements?

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Author Info

  • Langpap, Christian
  • Shimshack, Jay P.

Abstract

Every major domestic environmental statute provides for citizen suits yet we know little about their implications. This paper's key contribution is systematic micro-level empirical evidence on the extent to which private environmental prosecutions crowd out, or crowd in, public monitoring and public enforcement. We use judicial instruments in an attempt to isolate the causal influence of private enforcement on public enforcement. We find that private citizen suits crowd in public monitoring but significantly crowd out public sanctions.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-4YFCF3P-1/2/37d4333619575381019146474e8a1290
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 59 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 235-249

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:59:y:2010:i:3:p:235-249

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

Related research

Keywords: Citizen suits Citizen enforcement Enforcement Regulation Pollution policy Crowding out;

References

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  1. Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, 1992. "Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(1), pages 28-48.
  2. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-40, August.
  3. Payne, A. Abigail, 1998. "Does the government crowd-out private donations? New evidence from a sample of non-profit firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 323-345, September.
  4. Angrist, Joshua D, 2001. "Estimations of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice: Reply," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 19(1), pages 27-28, January.
  5. Dietrich Earnhart, 2004. "Panel Data Analysis of Regulatory Factors Shaping Environmental Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 391-401, February.
  6. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
  7. Mary E. Deily & Wayne B. Gray, 1989. "Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 8912, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  8. Angrist, Joshua D, 2001. "Estimations of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 19(1), pages 2-16, January.
  9. Earnhart, Dietrich, 2004. "Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly-owned treatment plants," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 655-681, July.
  10. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.
  11. Magat, Wesley A & Viscusi, W Kip, 1990. "Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 331-60, October.
  12. Chernozhukov, Victor & Hansen, Christian, 2008. "The reduced form: A simple approach to inference with weak instruments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 68-71, July.
  13. Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2005. "Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 519-540, November.
  14. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ashenmiller Bevin & Norman Catherine Shelley, 2011. "Measuring the Impact of Anti-SLAPP Legislation on Monitoring and Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-19, November.
  2. Goeschl, Timo & Jürgens, Ole, 2012. "Explaining uniformity in rule design: The role of citizen participation in enforcement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 166-177.
  3. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
  4. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
  5. Mieno, Taro & Brozovic, Nicholas, 2012. "Unraveling deterrence effects of regulatory activities under Clean Water Act," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association 124612, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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