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Harmonization and Optimal Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information

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  • Ulph, Alistair
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

    Volume (Year): 39 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 224-241

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:39:y:2000:i:2:p:224-241

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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    Cited by:
    1. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2010. "Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3085, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Edilio Valentini & Edilio Valentini, 2008. "Enforcement and Environmental Quality in a Decentralized Emission Trading System," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2008.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Per G. Fredriksson & John A. List & Daniel L. Millimet, 2003. "Chasing the Smokestack: Strategic Policymaking With Multiple Instruments," NBER Working Papers 9801, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2002. "Strategic Interaction and the Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 101-122, January.
    5. Per G. Fredriksson & Xenia Matschke & Jenny Minier, 2008. "Environmental Policy in Majoritarian Systems," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2008-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2009.
    6. Henry van Egteren & R. Smith & Dean McAfee, 2004. "Harmonization of Environmental Regulations When Firms are Judgment Proof," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 139-164, March.
    7. Fredriksson, Per G. & Mani, Muthukumara & Wollscheid, Jim R., 2006. "Environmental federalism : a panacea or Pandora's box for developing countries?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 3847, The World Bank.
    8. Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Harrison, Ann E., 2003. "Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-23, February.
    9. Henry van Egteren & R. Smith, 2002. "Environmental Regulations Under Simple Negligence or Strict Liability," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(4), pages 367-394, April.
    10. Paul Missios & Ida Ferrara & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2011. "Inter-regional Competition, Comparative Advantage, and Environmental Federalism," Working Papers, Ryerson University, Department of Economics 027, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    11. Henry Egteren & R. Smith & Andrew Eckert, 2006. "Environmental liability and harmonization in the presence of transboundary effects and hidden assets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 143-163, September.
    12. MacKenzie, Ian A., 2011. "Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 268-278, January.
    13. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton 0204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    14. Ian A. MacKenzie,, 2008. "On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich 08/83, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    15. van 't Veld, Klaas & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Environmental federalism and environmental liability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 105-119.
    16. Céline Grislain-Letrémy & Sabine Lemoyne de Forges, 2011. "Coordinating Flood Insurance and Collective Prevention Policies: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective," Working Papers, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique 2011-07, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.

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