International Trade Rules and Environmental Cooperation under Asymmetric Information
AbstractWith asymmetric information about local costs relative to international benefits of direct environmental policy, countries will rely too heavily on trade policy in controlling cross-border externalities in negotiated agreements. The unilateral externality policy chosen before negotiations by an exporter provides a signal about its local cost, modifying the information used in negotiations. The greater the exporter's incentive to use an externality tax as a second-best trade instrument, the better the signal. Consequently, exogenous limits on the unilateral use of trade policy in the absence of environmental cooperation can diminish the informational problem and improve the performance of prospective environmental agreements. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 38 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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