Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Second-best optimality of advertising when monopoly is sanctioned

Contents:

Author Info

  • Just, Richard E.
  • Pope, Rulon D.

Abstract

Monopoly pricing is sanctioned by government in a variety of cases (e.g., patent policy). We derive necessary and sufficient conditions on preferences determining when monopolists choose socially optimal, excessive, or inadequate advertising conditional on monopoly pricing behavior. We then derive the behavioral implications of these conditions in an empirically tractable framework that is estimable with typical observable data.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148619512000434
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economics and Business.

Volume (Year): 64 (2012)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 393-398

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:64:y:2012:i:6:p:393-398

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeconbus

Related research

Keywords: Advertising; Excessive advertising; Monopoly pricing; Optimal advertising; Social optimality;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:64:y:2012:i:6:p:393-398

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.