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Self-preservation as a foundation of rational behavior under risk

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  • Karni, Edi
  • Schmeidler, David

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 7 (1986)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 71-81

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:7:y:1986:i:1:p:71-81

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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Cited by:
  1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2002. "Weber's Law and the Biological Evolution of Risk Preferences: The Selective Dominance of the Logarithmic Utility Function," CESifo Working Paper Series 770, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Dekel, E. & Scotchmer, S., 1999. "On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games," Papers 4-99, Tel Aviv.
  4. Arthur J. Robson, 2001. "The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(1), pages 11-33, March.
  5. Wärneryd, Karl, 2001. "Rent, risk, and replication: preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Sandholm,W.H., 1998. "The evolution of preferences and rapid social change," Working papers 28, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Rabah Amir & Igor Evstigneev & Klaus Schenk-Hoppé, 2013. "Asset market games of survival: a synthesis of evolutionary and dynamic games," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 121-144, May.
  8. Philip R. P. Coelho & James E. McClure, 1996. "Social context and the utility of wealth: Addressing the Markowitz challenge," Working Papers 199602, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
  9. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2003. "Weber’s law and the biological evolution of risk preferences: The selective dominance of the logarithmic utility function, 2002 Geneva risk lecture," Munich Reprints in Economics 19612, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  10. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 637-679, July.
  11. Oyarzun, Carlos & Sarin, Rajiv, 2012. "Mean and variance responsive learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 855-866.

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