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When banks become shareholder activists

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  • Song, Keke
  • Wang, Jun

Abstract

This study investigates the relationships between bank activism and target firms’ debtholder value, shareholder value, and firm performance. We find that bank activists are more likely to target firms with heavier syndicated loan borrowing and lower credit quality than other shareholder activists. Bank activism events are associated with significantly positive abnormal bond returns, and this effect only exists in the subset of observations where bank shareholder activists possess a loan stake in the target firm. The target firms of bank activism exhibit a significant improvement in credit quality, coupled with decreases in syndicated loan interest rate spreads, crash risk, and CEO risk-taking incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Song, Keke & Wang, Jun, 2023. "When banks become shareholder activists," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:153:y:2023:i:c:s0378426623001164
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106895
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks; Corporate governance; Shareholder activism; Bond returns; Syndicated loans; Crash risk; Conflict of interest; Dual-holding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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