What motivates voters’ support for eminent domain reform: Ownership, vulnerability, or ideology?
AbstractThe analysis evaluates factors that motivate voter support for eminent domain reform. Economic models emphasize property ownership as a motivation for eminent domain restrictions (Fleck & Hanssen, 2010; Lamoreaux, 2011). Other research and court opinions point to ideology and vulnerability to takings as motivations for eminent domain reform. The empirical analysis tests these hypotheses using data from state-level referenda that responded to the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London. Property ownership, income, economic vulnerability and ideology have significant impacts on the odds of voting in favor of reform. Ethnic and educational factors do not have significant effects on reform outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
Eminent domain; Takings; Public use clause; Property rights; History; Voter behavior; Referenda; Fifth Amendment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
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- Lamoreaux, Naomi R., 2011. "The Mystery of Property Rights: A U.S. Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(02), pages 275-306, June.
- Carrie B. Kerekes, 2011. "Government Takings: Determinants of Eminent Domain," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 201-219.
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