Ordered search in differentiated markets
AbstractThis paper presents an ordered search model in which consumers search both for price and product fitness. I construct an equilibrium in which there is price dispersion and prices rise in the order of search. The top firms in consumer search process, though charge lower prices, earn higher profits due to their larger market shares. Compared to random search, ordered search can induce all firms to charge higher prices and harm market efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 29 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Search Price dispersion Product differentiation;
Other versions of this item:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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