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Cure for increasing health care costs: The Bernhoven case as driver of new standards of appropriate care

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  • van Leersum, Nicoline
  • Bennemeer, Peter
  • Otten, Marcel
  • Visser, Sander
  • Klink, Ab
  • Kremer, Jan A.M.

Abstract

Containing costs is a major challenge in health care. Cost and quality are often seen as trade-offs, but high quality and low costs can go hand-in-hand as waste exists in unnecessary and unfounded care. In the Netherlands, two healthcare insurers and a hospital collaborate to improve quality of care and decrease healthcare costs. Their aim is to reduce unnecessary care by shifting the business model and culture from a focus on volume to a focus on quality. Key drivers to support this are taking time for integrated diagnosis (‘first time right’), the right care at the right place and shared decision making between doctor and patient. Conditions to realize this are 1) contract innovation between the hospital and insurers to move away from fee-for-service reimbursement, 2) a culture change within the organization with emphasis on collaboration and empowerment of medical leadership and physicians to change daily practice, and 3) a reorganization of the hospital organization structure from a large number of medical departments to four business units related to the fundamental underlying patient need (acute care, solution shop, intervention unit and chronic care). Results from this whole-system-approach experiment show it is possible to provide better care (as experienced by patients) with lower volumes (16% lower DRG claims after 3 years) and provides valuable lessons for further healthcare reform.

Suggested Citation

  • van Leersum, Nicoline & Bennemeer, Peter & Otten, Marcel & Visser, Sander & Klink, Ab & Kremer, Jan A.M., 2019. "Cure for increasing health care costs: The Bernhoven case as driver of new standards of appropriate care," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 306-311.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:123:y:2019:i:3:p:306-311
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.01.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, 2014. "Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1320-1349, April.
    2. Klink, Ab & Schakel, H. Christiaan & Visser, Sander & Jeurissen, Patrick, 2017. "The arduous quest for translating health care productivity gains into cost savings. Lessons from their evolution at economic scoring agencies in the Netherlands and the US," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 1-8.
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    Cited by:

    1. Remers, Toine E.P. & Wackers, Erik M.E. & van Dulmen, Simone A. & Jeurissen, Patrick P.T., 2022. "Towards population-based payment models in a multiple-payer system: the case of the Netherlands," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(11), pages 1151-1156.
    2. Kebin Deng & Zhong Ding & Jieni Li, 2022. "Medical insurance and physician-induced demand in China: the case of hemorrhoid treatments," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 257-294, September.

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